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part of the 19th century reflected the relatively secure establishment of the
bourgeois nation-state. Equally clearly, the social and political order which
that state embodied has been under continuing, fundamental challenge since
World War I-under a challenge which has inexorably "politicized" an ever-
widening range of human endeavor, including not only science and literature,
but also the judicial processes through which men seek justice. Professor
K'irchheimer dedicates his book to "the past, present and future victims of
political justice." Victims there are. But in a deeper sense, they are victims not
simply of subversion control laws and drum courts, but of an as yet undeter-
mined sea-change transformation in the structure of nations and societies.
VINCENT E. STARZINGERjt
ANCIENT ROMAN STATUTES. A translation with Introduction, Commentary,
Glossary and Index. By Allan Chester Johnson,' Paul Robinson Coleman-
Norton,2 Frank Card Bourne.3 General Editor, Clyde Pharr.4 Austin: Uni-
versity of Texas Press, 1961. Pp. xxxi, 290. $15.00.
THIS volume contains translations of 332 chronologically arranged texts pre-
pared by a team of classical scholars and forms the second step in the ambitious
project of publishing a translation of all the source material of Roman Law.
The first volume is Professor Pharr's translation of the Theodosian Code.5 The
editors report progress with Justinian's Corpus Juris Cizilis. It should be said
at the outset that the physical form of this volume is of a very high order and
most creditable to a University press.
The title is somewhat misleading. Many of the texts are leges in the strict
legal sense of comitial legislation and a great many more are within the ex-
tended (and perfectly justified) definition of lex in the Glossary.6 But likewise
there are many documents of a judicial and administrative nature which are
very far from legislative in character.7 In this connection it is important to
notice the criteria of selection which the editors have adopted. These are set
out in their Introduction and expressly exclude, inter alia, illustrations of
applied law or negotia, and texts quoted in imperial codifications. Though
neither exclusion is in fact complete, this last self-denying restriction has en-
tailed the exclusion of much that one would otherwise expect to see-the lex
tAssistant Professor, Department of Government, Dartmouth College.
1. Late, West Professor of Classics, Princeton University.
2. Kennedy Associate Professor of Latin, Princeton University.
3. Associate Professor of Classics, Princeton University.
4. Research Professor of Classical Languages, University of Texas.
5. THEODOSIAN CODE (Pharr ed. 1952).
6. P. 267.
7. E.g., p. 124, Doc. 147 is a cognitio of Augustus on a homicide appeal where the
issue concerned the criminal liability of the owner of a slave who dropped a chamber pot
on the head of the deceased when the latter was attempting to break into the defendant's
dwelling.
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Aquilia and other fundamental legislative texts. To this last exclusion and to
the additional exclusion of documents "merely reported or reproduced in in-
direct discourse" the editors have felt impelled to make a few exceptions-the
Laws of the Kings,8 the Twelve Tables,9 and Julian's consolidation of the
praetorian and aedilician Edicts.'0 The general scheme of publication no doubt
warrants the editors' method, but it must be said that the effect for this volume
is that texts preserved through legal sources (apart from inscriptions and
papyri) appear less well represented than those preserved through lay litera-
ture.
The bulk of the texts are taken from the three great source books: Bruns'
Fontes," Girard's Textes,12 and Riccobono's FIRA. 13 These collections were
compiled very much "in usum scholarum," without translation,' 4 the texts them-
selves laden with the apparatus of textual criticism, and all comment in Latin.
The present translation therefore is much to be welcomed, for there are many
lawyers, historians and others, who, without being specialists in this field, may
expect to find great value in the collection. The responsibility of the translators
is in consequence considerable and generally they have discharged their duty
admirably.
But a preliminary word of warning is required. Throughout, the translators
have followed implicitly the views of Professor Daube in his Forms of Roman
Legislation ' 5 and this has resulted in disagreement with Professor Pharr, the
General Editor. Thus, in note 36a to Doc. 45 (to which note there are numer-
ous cross references) a collision occurs over the correct translation of oportere.
The matter is important because on it turns the question whether a particular
enactment may be read in a mandatory or permissive sense. All common law-
yers are familiar with these questions of construction regarding the difference
between duties and powers as they arise in English texts and tenses. The trans-
lators on every occasion follow Professor Daube literally and render oportet
as "it is proper, correct," and the General Editor on every occasion takes issue
on the ground that the natural and ordinary sense is imperative.
At the risk of treading on disputed ground the opinion may be ventured that
the criticism of the General Editor does not sufficiently take into account Pro-
fessor Daube's statement, "That oportet far more often denotes what is neces-
sary than what is permitted is indisputable."' 6 One may agree with Professor
8. P. 3, Doc. 1. More legend than legislation. The only authentic text of the pre-
republican era, the Black Stone of the Roman Forum, is unintelligible.
9. P. 18, Doc. 8. The typography does not follow the standard editions which attempt
to distinguish by capital and lower case type direct quotation and paraphrase. The editors
deliberately but prudently decline trial by typographical ordeal.
10. P. 182, Doc. 244, p. 204, Doc. 245. From a strictly legal point of view these are
the most important texts in the volume.
11. FONTES IuIus ROMANI ANTIQur (7th ed. Bruns 1909-1912).
12. TEXTES DE DRorr RomAIN (6th ed. Girard 1937).
13. FONTES Iuais ROmANI ANTEJUSTINIANI (2d ed. Riccobono 1940-1943).
14. Except for the rendering of Greek texts into Latin.
15. DAuBE, FoRms OF ROmAN LEGIsLATIOx (1956).
16. Id. at 13.
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Daube's convincing analysis, and at the same time offer the hard counsel that
each case must be considered on its merits to discover whether we should say,
"The correct thing is to wear evening dress" (mandatory) or "It is perfectly
correct to wear lounge suit" (permissive).
Another division of opinion betveen the General Editor and Professor Daube
occurs over the curious form "e quis fecisse velit."17 This at first sight ap-
pears to express a polite regret, "no one should wish to have done so and so,"
not even a pious hope, "Ne quis facere velit," but indeed the contexts show
that it was a very nasty legislative threat. The General Editor launches a
vigorous philological attack on Professor Daube'"s translation as given above
and proposes for every ease the translation that "no one should try" or "at-
tempt" or "endeavour." For the lawyer the attack seems to be pressed too far
when Professor Pharr writes that "it is fundamental principle of most legal
systems, including our own, that the attempt or intent to commit a crime is
punishable."' 8 It must be carefully noted that Professor Daube's interpretation
of the form is that it "is used solely for the prohibition of acts, never for the
prohibition of qualities."' 9 It is impossible to suppose a legislative form dealt
solely with a quality of mind, and moreover "it is a priori incredible that an
ancient legislative form concentrated on attempt. '20 On the other hand, there
is nothing intrinsically improbable in a prohibition designed to cover conduct
which does not completely achieve intended results as well as conduct which
does. Further, the perfect infinitive is apt to include retroactive effect and it is
worth noticing that this form is found in the field of police measures, public
order, and dictates to defeated enemies. But in this review too much space
must not be devoted to a philological puzzle, despite the legal implications.
The translators have used for this form the future tense imperatively; the
difficulty is relegated to the notes.
The translations are generally sound. In most instances, the translators have
stuck closely to the received text, though the result as a consequence sometimes
looks queer. 2 1 In some few instances they have taken a freer hand where a text
17. P. 27, Doc. 28, nn.1, la. Incidentally not appropriate to statutes properly so called
and appearing only in senatorial decrees and edictal provisions.
18. Possibly the reference to intent is meant as synonymous with attempt but even so
it is open to criticism as susceptible to misunderstanding. Common law does not attach
criminal liability to criminal intent per se. Even conspiracy, purely a mental state, requires
communication between conspirators. True, in English law, a treasonable intent "compass-
ing the King's death" is itself criminal, but overt acts evidencing that intent have always
been necessary for conviction. The Federal law of the United States neatly illustrates the
principle. Republic v. Malin, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 33 (1778) held that a citizen who meant
to join hostile British forces but found that he had by mistake attached himself to a party
of United States troops, could not be convicted of treason. For Roman Law, DIGEsT 50.
16. 225 is quite explicit that criminal intent is not of itself punishable.
19. DAUBE, op. cit. .mpra note 15, at 45.
20. Id. at 39.
21. E.g., p. 204, Doc. 245, § 6, the list of prohibited animals under the highway and
market regulations of the Aediles runs, inter alia, "a dog, a boar or a young boar." Vel
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is manifestly faulty and have restored it to good sense.22 The terminology of
the law can raise difficulty for the translator and in certain places the wise
decision has been taken to leave a term of art (e.g., actio in rent) untranslated
but with an explanatory note. In some other places where an English equivalent
is attempted the result is not wholly satisfactory. Thus, in the examples of
certificates of discharge from the armed forces,23 conubium is rendered as "law-
ful marriage." The translators of course know (and in notes explain) that this
means "civil law marriage," but the reader who knows little of the law of per-
sonal status can easily overlook the legal significance unless he keeps his eye
on the notes. In a few places it is possible to detect a misunderstanding of the
terminology by the translators themselves.2 4 On a point of high technicality, as
coemptio of a woman sui juris, one finds editorial treatment that is open to
question.25 On the legal disabilities of women, the statement in the Glossary
minorem can hardly be right. Is verrem vel minocem aprum a possible reading? Perhaps
the words are best deleted altogether, as in Institutes 4. 9. 1. In this part of the Edict the
translators also follow Riccobono in inserting marks of omission for the general words of
Digest, 21. 1. 41, but "et generaliter aliudve quod noceret animal" etc. can hardly be read
except as a quotation if the third word is correctly written.
22. A good example is their handling of Doc. 285, at p. 229, a rescript on illegal exac-
tions of soldiers and officials, a theme significantly prominent in texts of the later Empire,
and not absent in earlier times.
23. P. 150, Doc. 184; p. 151, Doc. 186; p. 152, Doc. 189; p. 215, Doc. 260; p. 228, Doc.
283.
24. In note 2 to Doc. 181, p. 148, the principle of res indicata (a clear application in
the text) is confused with that of stare decisis. (The rhetoricians certainly spoke of prece-
dent as res indicata, but this usage is not calculated to lead to legal clarity.) In Doc. 269,
p. 221 and Doc. 305, p. 241, usucapion appears as a term applicable to prescription both
iure civile and iure gentium. The translators know that civil law prescription was applicable
only to citizens, but do not make explicit the legal distinction between solum italicun and
solum provinciale which existed until Justinian's time. Civil law prescription (umscapio)
conferring civil law title could apply only to the former. Longi temporis praescriptio for
provincial land was not originally acquisitive prescription but rather operated on the prin-
ciple of a statute of limitations. Praescriptio signified the praescripta verba in the formu-
lary clause praescriptio pro reo. Starting as an adjectival principle, it became an extinctive
prescription in substantive law. In Justinian's time it had become acquisitive or vesting of
title.
25. Thus a comment on coemptio matrimonji causa (p. 5, Doc. 1, note 3) speaks of a
wife in manu as her husband's chattel, an unfortunate expression especially in a legal sys-
tem which included slavery, for the slave is a person truly within the description of human
chattels. Capitis demnimtio minima is thus superficially confused with c. d. maxima. Again,
at p. 211, Doc. 256, § 33, the text (trans. Lenel & Partsch) runs: Mulieri Romanac
praeterquam coemptione facta testari non licet. The translation "beyond the so-called
coemptio," and the reference in n.9 to fictitious marriage followed by immediate divorce,
cannot but puzzle the lay reader. In coemptio fiduciae causa the non-matrimonial purpose
is better indicated by speaking of mancipation and manumission. A comment on GArus I.
1lSa, would have been helpful. A generation before this document was published in Egypt,
Hadrian had abolished the testamentary incapacity of a woman sui itris and therefore the
need for the coemptio device. No doubt Egypt was an anomaly in the field of public or
constitutional law, but this appears to be an interesting discrepancy in the field of purely
private law.
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that "guardianship over women beyond the age of twelve years disappeared in
the late Republic" 26 must be an oversight, for tutela mulierum survived through-
out the classical period.27 And in several comments one comes across state-
ments that are open to argument in terms of law.28
Nevertheless in a work of substantial achievement it may seem ungracious
and ungrateful to pick out minor flaws. Some of the notes on difficult texts are
admirable. For example, there is an excellent discussion 29 of Caracalla's grant
of citizenship and the baffling clause of exclusion of the dediticii.30 The whole
matter has been recently reviewed by Professor A. H. M. Jones in his Studies
in Roman Government and Administration (1960).31 A possible explanation
of the exclusion clause, Professor Jones suggests, is that it excluded not from
the general grant of citizenship 32 but from a subsidiary provision of the grant,
dealing with the local citizenship of the new citizens. 33 Peregrini dediticii (that
is, all provincials not organized into civitates but direct subjects of Rome) be-
came citizens of the Empire but were excluded from the requirement of affilia-
tion into local citizenship, at least where they were not residents in a particular
city or its territory. While no certain conclusion is possible, the view expressed
in the present volume also has much to recommend it, namely, that more prob-
ably "the dediticii formed a very small group, being perhaps those persons
whose status was defined by the Aelio-Sentian Law of 4 A.D. (Justinian, Inst.
1. 5. 3), who were excluded from the grant. 34
The reasons for the grant have been similarly canvassed. The suggestion is
now made that "Caracalla, an ardent admirer of Alexander the Great, and one
26. P. 264.
27. Indeed one of the notes to which cross reference is made makes this very point.
See p. 14, Doc. 8, n.32. (XII Tables, V. 1, is taken straight from GAius I, 144-5). The
reason for survival is obvious, when it is appreciated that the basis of guardianship in the
form of tutela legitinia was the right of intestate succession and a woman sui iuris had no
direct testamentary capacity before Hadrian changed the law. See note 25 supra. By
classical times the whole institution of the guardianship of adult women was certainly
irrational, even allowing for its restricted scope, e.g., it never included administratio.
28. E.g., in the praetorial Edict, p. 199, Doc. 244, n.93, aestinatum is discussed in
terms of sale, whereas it was just the difficulty of contractual classification that impelled
the lawyers to develop a special action praescriptis verbis. Probably the editors have taken
this debatable clause in the Edict of the urban Praetor as referring to the actio aestimatoria
or quanti ininoris in fact given by the Edict of the curule Aediles.
29. Contributed by Professor Donald Mackenzie of Princeton University.
30. P. 225, Doc. 277, Constitutio Antoniniana.
31. 127. This is a radical revision of 26 JOURNAL OF ROMAN STUDIES 223-35 (1936).
32. The view that it did is only tenable if dediticli is a term descriptive alone of sur-
rendered barbarians and freedmen with criminal records.
33. Origo, to use the technical expression of the jurists. See Glossary, p. 268, s.v. In
Egypt, where this text was discovered, there were no civitates except the few Greek cities.
Doe. 270 at p. 221 illustrates this organization of Roman provincial administration.
34. The lex Junia (on freedmen with Latin status) and the lex Aelia Sentia (on
freedmen with criminal records) remained in force till Justinian's abolition of inferior
grades of free status. The principal disability of freedmen with criminal records had al-
ways been incapacity to become Roman citizens.
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who had dreams of uniting the empires of Persia and Rome, took this step of
uniting all his subjects in a common bond of Roman citizenship in preparation
for the proposed union." From earliest times, however, the Emperor has been
accused of more mundane motives, primarily of increasing the revenue from
fiscal liabilities attaching to citizenship. The safest view seems to be that this
was only the culmination of a policy extending citizen status which had been
pursued by earlier Emperors. Moreover, the grant had little significance in the
field of public law by that time (212 A.D. or a little later) ; in the field of pri-
vate law it had the merit of introducing a high degree of simplification.
It is not possible in the compass of a review to indicate fully the vast range
of these documents. Political, social, and economic historians will find this vol-
ume a mine of varied and valuable information. It may be considered a remark-
able feat for a small body of editors to have handled so ably such a variety of
materials. They have also placed Roman lawyers in their debt. The current
work in this series on Justinian's Corpus Juris Civilis is a formidable under-
taking and those engaged in it will be wished well in their exacting task.
DAvID YALEt
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY 'OF THE LAND LAW. By A. W. B.
Simpson.' Oxford University Press, 1961. Pp. xx, 276. $4.00.
Tis book contrives to be both learned and readable, a joinder of qualities
more often a matter of aspiration than attainment. It is designed to replace
Holdsworth's Historical Introduction to the Land Law, written in 1927 and
now out of print. But Mr. Simpson's book is not a revised version of Holds-
worth's; it is in form and substance a new book and it departs in a decided
manner from the underlying assumption and purpose of the older work.
Holdsworth wrote for the beginner who requires some historical information
in his approach to the modem law. One cannot recommend this book to such
a reader. It is essentially a book which ought. to be read by the man who has
already gone some distance in his study of the modem law and now requires
an explanation of how basic principles and concepts came into existence and
were shaped in development. That such an explanation ought to be sought
by any serious student. in the field of Real Property is not a self-evident
proposition, but it is nevertheless a very important one. Experience in teaching
in an English University suggests that the student finds greater difficulty in
acquiring a comprehensive view of fundamental principles in this branch of the
law than in many others, not because it is so much "lawyers' law" but because
its different parts are so far interdependent that the average student finds
tVisiting Associate Professor of Law, Yale University Law School.
1. Fellow of Lincoln College, Oxford University.
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